Thursday, October 18, 2007

Free First Time Casting

Science

2.1 Quiera Dios liberarme de la astronomía , para que pueda dedicarme a trabajar en mi obra sobre la armonía del mundo.

(Citado en Franz Hammer, "Die Astrologie des Johannes Kepler", Sudhoffs Archiv 55, 2 [1971], p. 124; ca. 1610)

2.2 He completado ya mi obra confesional ... Me entrego ahora a una sagrada locura ... Estoy lanzando los dados y escribiendo un libro para el presente o el futuro. No me importa cuál. ¡Quizá [el libro] deba esperar cien años para encontrar su lector!

( Ibid., 1618)

Monday, September 24, 2007

Provision List Sailboats



At all ages men have sought to bring together the sum of knowledge and experience of the day, with everything one could explain his relationship with the universe and its possibilities in the . In the ordinary way could never achieve. Because the unity of things is not recognized by the ordinary mind, in the ordinary state of consciousness. The ordinary mind, refracted through the innumerable and contradictory intimations of the various aspects of human nature, must reflect the world so varied and confusing as the man himself. One unit, a model, an all-encompassing meaning, if any, could only be discerned or experienced in a different state of consciousness. This would only be achievable by a mind that had unified itself. What
unit, for example, might perceive even the most brilliant physicists, philosophers, theologians, which distracted while riding on a stool, gets angry for being disappointed, he does not realize when angry at his wife and, in general, is subject to blindness trivial everyday ordinary mind and whose work usually done with a lack of attention? Any unit that scope in such a state can exist only in his imagination.

Therefore, the attempt to gather into a single beam knowledge has always connected with the search for a new state with science. It is meaningless and futile, apart from this search. Perhaps

arguably even the few attempts that have been successful and that have reached us, show signs of being one mind-products of that search, when it proved successful. The only convincing 'models of the universe' in existence are those left by men who, obviously, achieved a completely different relationship with the world and awareness of him, one that relates to ordinary experience.
Because these real 'models of the universe' must not only In shape and internal structure of the universe but also must disclose the relationship of man with it and its present and possible destinations in it. In this sense, some of the Gothic cathedrals are complete models of the universe, while a modern planetarium, despite all its beauty, all knowledge and all its accuracy, it is not. Because the latter ignored the whole man.
The difference, of course, lies in the fact that the cathedrals were designed, directly or indirectly, by men who belonged to the schools to achieve higher states of consciousness and had the advantage of experience in these schools, while designers are the planetary scientists and technicians who, though intelligent and qualified enough in their field, can not claim a particular knowledge of the potentialities of the human machine that must work.

Specifically, if we have some keys to their interpretation, the most striking fact about these old models of the universe, that arise in ages, continents and cultures apart, is its similarity, so deep it could be done a very good defense of the idea that higher consciousness always reveals the same truth, based solely on the comparative study of certain existing models of the universe and appear to result from it-for example, the cathedral of Chartres, the Great Sphinx, the New Testament, the Divine Comedy or, on the other hand, certain cosmic diagrams left by the alchemists of the seventeenth century, designers of the Tarot cards and Russian painters of some icons and banners Tibetans.
Of course, one of the main difficulties in the way of this comparative study is the fact that all these models are expressed in different languages \u200b\u200band that for the ordinary mind unprepared, a different language implies a different truth. In fact, this is an illusion characteristic of ordinary state of man.
By contrast, even a small improvement their perception reveals the same language, the same formulation, may hold diametrically opposed, in both language and formulations that at first sight have nothing in common can actually refer the same thing. For example, while the words honor, love, democracy are universally used, it is almost impossible to find two people who attribute the same meaning. That is because the different uses of the same word may be not comparable. On the other hand, seem strange he thought the cathedral of Chartres, a deck of Tarot cards and certain Tibetan deities multicéfalas heavily armed and are in fact made of exactly the same ideas, that is exactly comparable.

It is thus necessary to consider at this point the question of language in relation to the construction of a model of the universe, and drawing up a scheme of unity. Basically, language or form of expression is divided according to interest either of the roles of men, family, or potential. For example, a particular idea can be expressed in philosophical or scientific language, appealing to man's intellectual function: can be expressed in religious or poetic language, which appeals to their role emotional rites or dances express interest to their motor function, and , every path can be expressed in odor or physical attitudes that appeal to their physiology instinctive.
course, the best 'models of the universe "created by schools in the past, aspired to combine the formulations of what they wanted to express, in many languages, so as to affect many or all functions at the same time and thus partly offset the contradiction between the different aspects of human nature, we already referred to. In the cathedral, for example, successfully combined with the language of poetry, attitudes, ritual, music, smell, art and architecture, and something similar seems to have had in the theater of the mysteries of Eleusis. In other cases, in the Great Pyramid for example, it seems that the language of architecture has been used not only in the symbolism of its form, but in order to create in the person going through the building in a certain sense, series well defined shock and emotional impressions, which had different meanings for themselves and were calculated to reveal the real nature of the person that supports them.

This objective relates to the use of language-that is, the use of a defined language to evoke a definite idea of \u200b\u200bthe effect prior knowledge to be created, the role that will be affected and the type of person who will respond to that . We again have to admit that such employment target language usually is not known, except perhaps in the elementary form of advertising, "and that the highest usage may result, directly or indirectly mind, the knowledge gained in states higher consciousness.

addition to these languages \u200b\u200brecognizable by men, through their ordinary language there are other ways of proceeding and appeal to supra-normal functions, ie functions that can develop in humans, but which do not ordinarily enjoy . For example, the language of a higher emotional function, in which the formula has the power to evoke a huge number of meanings longer be simultaneous or successive and. Some of the most exquisite poetry, and indeed memorable, but increasing reveal something new-can never fully understood, may fall into this category. With yet more evidence, the Gospels have been signed in this language and for this reason, each of its verses reminiscent of a hundred men, a hundred different and contradictory meanings ever,

In the language of a more emotional function high and, in particular, higher intellectual function, symbols play important role. They are based on true understanding of analogies between the two cosmos, which form, function or law of a cosmos used to suggest forms, functions and corresponding laws in other cosmos.

This understanding belongs exclusively to a higher role and potential of man and must always produce a sense of confusion and even frustramiento when he wants to achieve with ordinary functions, such as logical thinking.

However, higher degrees of emotional language does not require any external expression and, therefore can not be misinterpreted
This digression about the final language is necessary to explain in part the form of this book. For this, we must also admit, is intended as a model the universe-that is, a set or design knowledge at our disposal, ready to show as a whole or a cosmic unity
is certainly wrapped in the guise of scientific language and, therefore, is directed primarily to intellectual function and people who prevails in that role. Indeed, the author is well recognized that this language is the slowest, most laborious and in some ways the most difficult to follow for all languages. The poetry, myths and fairy tales, for example, can penetrate more deeply and bring ideas with much more strength and fluidity to the reader's emotional understanding.

Perhaps then possible an attempt in this direction

At the same time, the reader accustomed to the language and thought scientists encounter difficulties. Free use is made of the analogy throughout the book, may seem incongruous. And, for your benefit, it is best to do here for an explanation as complete as possible and advance a frank recognition of the shortcomings of this method. Two roads

man has to study the universe. The first is by induction: it examines the phenomenon, which classifies and then tries to infer those laws and principles. This is the most commonly used method in science, the second is by implication: having received or disclosed or discovered certain general laws and principles, attempts to infer the application of those laws to special studies and life. This is the method generally used by religion. The first begins with "facts" and seek to build up "laws." The second begins with "laws" and tries to descend to the "facts."
These two methods, in fact, relate to the work of two different human functions. The first is the method of ordinary logical mind, which is permanently at our disposal. The second is derived from a potential function of man, which usually is inactive due to lack of energy nerve of sufficient intensity and we can call a higher mental function. This feature, on the rare occasions that acts reveals man laws in action, go all the phenomenal world as a result of the law. All formulations
true universal laws come from, recent or remote, the work of this superior function somewhere and in any man. At the same time, the application and understanding of the laws revealed in large stretches of time and culture where such disclosure is not it, the man has to rely on the ordinary logical mind.
This fact is recognized even today in scientific thinking. In its "Nature of the Universe" (Nature of the Universe) (1950), Fred Hoyle writes: "The procedure in all branches of physical science, is the theory of Newtonian gravity, Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, the theory of Einstein's relativity and the theory of quan tum, is the same root. D comprises two steps. The first is to assume, by some sort of inspiration, a set of mathematical equations. The second is to associate the symbols used in equations with measurable physical quantities. "
The difference between the work of these two minds could not have said it better.

But this is where the large uncertainty arises of human understanding. Because these two minds can never ordinarily understood each other. Between them a very considerable difference in speed. The way it is impossible to communicate a laborer who toils beside the road with a load of firewood and a car that crosses quickly to eighty miles per hour, due to the difference in speed is usually impossible and communication between logical mind and a superior mind, for the same reason. A logical mind the marks left by the higher mind seem arbitrary, superstitious, illogical, unproven. For the higher mind, the work of the logical mind seem heavy, unnecessary, and forgotten the fundamental issue So
ordinary remedied this difficulty maintaining separate these two methods, which are given different names and different action areas. The religious books or those of higher mathematics, dealing with laws and principles, refrain from using the inductive method. The science, dealing with accumulations of facts observed, presumably refrain laws in advance. And how are people who write and read different books in one form or another class, or the same people read both kinds but quite separate parts of his mind, these two methods are arranged to be together without too much friction between them.

But in this book are used simultaneously both methods. Certain great principles and laws of the universe, which found expression in different countries and all ages, and from time to time, are rediscovered by individual men through the work of a higher role momentary receive free credit. Of these deductions are made down to the phenomenal world usually accessible to us, primarily through the analog method. At the same time an attempt is made to study and classify the events and phenomena that surround us and, by inference, so that sort of lead in the ratings rise to the abstract laws that descend, in turn, from above.
In fact, by above reason, which derives from the various functions in widely different speeds, never found the two methods. Among the allowable deductions from general laws and the permissible inference of fact, there is always an invisible area, where both should and must unite, but in which such a union and goes on forever without being unproved.
For these reasons, the author is prepared to admit that the plan of this book that attempts to reconcile the two methods, is impossible. Fully realize that an attempt of its kind in inevitably becomes a kind of sleight of hand, almost a trap. And also realize that this juggling tricks no form a professional scientist, exclusively linked to the logical method.
At the same time is satisfied, first, that the science of today, without principles, is moving towards speculation and increasingly obtuse materialism, and, second, that religious or philosophical principles, without coordinating with scientific knowledge that characterizes our age can muster for today only a minority interest. This conviction persuades him to take the risk. Those who use the logical method exclusively, never be satisfied with the arguments provided, which, admittedly, suffer from logical gaps and blemishes. On the other hand, for those willing to accept both methods, we hope to present sufficient evidence to make it possible for each player tries to bridge the gap between the world of facts-the quotidian and the great laws - for himself. Task
not it can ever be in a book either, nor would the largest number of events or greater amount of c cough, usually available to science whether present or future, which could make it possible. Plus, with the help and effort can be made for each individual to his own satisfaction.
Meanwhile, for the common man interested in their own destiny but not especially in science, we can say only, with closer examination, you may find that this book is not as 'scientific' as at first sight. Scientific language is the fashion, is now mandatory language and the language of psychology was fashionable thirty years ago, the passionate language fashionable in Elizabethan times and the language of religion was the Fashion in the Middle Ages. When people are induced to buy toothpaste or cigarettes by pseudoscientific arguments and explanations, of course this in any way correspond to the mentality of the time. Then the truth must also be expressed scientifically.
At the same time, does not suggest by this that the language Scientific employee is a disfigurement, a simulation or a fake. The explanation given, so far has been possible to verify them, are correct and correspond to the reality of the facts. What is claimed that the principles used with the same correction could be applied to any other forms of human experience, with results of equal or greater interest. And these principles are important, rather than the sciences to which they are applied.
"A new model of the universe" Introduction, PD Ouspensky

Saturday, August 11, 2007

Exertion Headaches Left Exercise

Husserl's Phenomenology: learning to see.

Husserl's phenomenology: LEARNING TO SEE

We take our destiny in their hands, we become responsible for our history through reflection, but also by a decision to commit our life, and in both cases, is a violent act that is verified by exercising. Merlau-Ponty

Discuss phenomenology, the philosophical movement created by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is almost as much as talk about the philosophy of the twentieth century, and I think you can point out two reasons in support of that view. First, if you look away from the concrete formulations that Husserl gave his ideas, many philosophers of our century have acknowledged the influence of Husserl in a greater or lesser degree. Heidegger was a direct disciple of Husserl, and he learned a certain style of philosophizing, but soon came the theoretical differences. Sartre, in the thirties, he discovered the author in ideas relating to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, which is the most popular exhibition that Husserl did a theory. The influence on Sartre is notorious. Some authors critical of the twentieth century, as Merleau-Ponty, have belonged to phenomenology. The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur finds its starting point in Husserl. And we could even go further and share the view Montero defending Miller (in Return to phenomenology) that, for those who understand ideas and not schools, analytic philosophy of language and participate in the same spirit of phenomenology. Authors such as Strawson, Austin, Searle and Grice are relatives of phenomenology without forcing a lot of comparisons.

more complicated view is presented Gerd Brand (in the key texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein) that Wittgenstein would phenomenologist par excellence.

philosophical movement created by Husserl has been growing and branching out with over the years. To get a good idea de la increíble amplitud del árbol fenomenológico que casi no deja una ciencia ni una disciplina filosófica sin cubrir- puede consultarse con la obra de Bernhard Waldenfels (Introducción a la fenomenología. De Husserl a Derrida). La fenomenología es una filosofía viva, se publican anales y revistas, se dan congresos y seminarios. ¿Cuál puede ser el motivo de este éxito de la fenomenología? Para responder a esta pregunta, entramos en la segunda razón. Ya uno de los primeros discípulos de Husserl, Adolf Reinach, había señalado que la fenomenología, más que un sistema de doctrinas filosóficas, era un método. Y un método que además envuelve un desarrollo ilimitado por principle.

This is the meaning of the title I gave to my article: phenomenology as an attempt to establish the conditions of possibility of philosophy as an attempt to show the road to see the world in a philosophical manner. In an effort to reflect metaphilosophical, Husserl sought a place for philosophy, a place that no one but she could fill, and almost exhausted its energies in that effort. For that reason, leaving aside the false radicalism metaphilosophical, phenomenology as a philosophical theory just opts for precise thesis: while one might almost say that everything that falls under the heading "philosophy made a serious effort and rigor "can be considered as" phenomenology. "Moreover, Husserl being the initiator of the current, is partly understandable that his philosophy is affected by all the hesitation characteristic of exploring new ground. Husserl , who was a man steeped in theory and overly scrupulous, again and again about their own ideas, and tried several times to fully expose, adding more and more detail, complicating the terminology. At his death left more than 45,000 pages shorthand and I think that still publish their works under the title of Husserl.

However, it was considered a novice of philosophy, which had only ventured into the trails of the vast territory that opened the phenomenological method. But do not forget when we read Husserl, that this philosophy confusing, incomplete and sometimes contradictory, was the inspiration for great works of the twentieth century, full of ideas perhaps more clear and attractive, and that debt either theoretical or critical debate with it, there are many philosophers of our century who have gone through phenomenology and have helped to develop and qualify it with their theories. So I think that understanding is necessary to understand Husserl our century, at least philosophically. In this article we will, in as far as possible, closer to this understanding.

Phenomenology in Logical Investigations was born as a refutation of psychologism. Psychologism intended as a way to solve some problems posed by the theory of knowledge and science, without departing from the narrow confines of positivism "facts." The idea of \u200b\u200bpsychologism was to be a certain composition of place, off the ground without common sense of his time to get the advantage thus an appearance of immediate intelligibility. Then, is airing the theory of knowledge, pretending that paradoxes were discovered not only the result of dark philosophemes. The composition of place that I mentioned is this: we start by accepting the reality of a world of objects as something comprehensible in itself, as an impassable horizon beyond which no question is meaningless. Within that world of objects placed the human being as an object among objects, however, the human being we find a very peculiar object. What is consciousness or mental life by which this object represents all the others? Is it a property of that object? In our positivist world objects can only support the casual link and relationship between objects.

Can you explain perhaps the knowledge as a causal influence an object on another object? Psychologism yielded to the temptation Cartesian conception of consciousness or mental life as a thing, a substantial reality. In the last decades of the nineteenth century had been established psychology as a science, to prove that it was possible to apply the experimental method to study the mental life of animals and humans. And from his birth until much later, psychology, intended to become a real "physics of the soul", a claim which is strongly criticized by Husserl, according to our author, could never be reached just this conception of the subject-while-knower while trying to follow him to exhaust in all its nuances through an empirical science underlying intent under which the biased view of him as an object among objects. It was totally absurd

the alleged final foundation of knowledge by psychology, arguing that knowledge should be seen as a psychological event, and that the mystery will finally be enlightened by scientific reason. Given that from the time of Descartes's theory of knowledge had been the bulwark of the possibility and necessity of philosophical reflection, to be solved his "problems" with a science as psychology, philosophy was not "work" and Therefore, without "meaning." But the psychologist had gone too far: when trying to close the circle of scientific objectivity about himself, all he got was to highlight the very limits of all knowledge.

theory of knowledge could not be overcome by psychological research because it was knowledge. Neither the logic could be reduced to laws governing only the human psyche, since psychology was the logic for granted in its reasoning. "The specific relativism makes this claim: for each species of beings capable of judging what is true according to its constitution or under the laws of thought be taken as true ... the formation of a species is a fact. And facts can be learned only facts. Found the truth in the establishment of a sort ... means to give, then, the character of a fact.

But this is a contradiction. Every event is individual, that is, determined at the time. But talk of a temporary truth only makes sense referring to a fact stated by it (if it is indeed true) but not referring to herself. "(Logical Investigations, Part I, chap. VII). The root of the problem was-it may seem like gibberish, in a misconception of what a concept. In a way the human mind is not made in regular operation, or the absolute stillness of the concepts nor the fleeting sensations. So when Husserl proposes a philosophical journey to the bottom of the concept, considering it as such a concept, completely apart to find out anything about their nature or reality, and pursuing pure connections between concepts in a domain where the queen just complete isolation and loneliness among conceptual entities themselves perfectly identical, we find a breath of fresh air to the opposite theory that takes the concepts in their surface reality of mental events, without getting into the Honduras of its meaning, and will explain its occurrence through a genetic process.

But Husserl considered that there should be a purely conceptual theory of knowledge: therefore could not be used not one of knowledge already established. That is the meaning that has its famous epojé (suspension of the trial) or phenomenological reduction. To study the experiences as such, must change our ordinary way of living them. Husserl describes this as ordinary or natural attitude as a direct and naive point of consciousness to the world and its objects, such as attention and interest in them.

The natural attitude is charged with tacitly accepted as valid interpretations of prejudice, of confusing intellectualizations leading to lack of understanding.

epojé The result of the phenomenal is that our attention shifts to objects by way of giving these objects in consciousness, that is, phenomena in the phenomenological sense. Then the phenomenologist only accept as valid those phenomena that are given two originally, and are the basis for all subsequent interpretation and intellectualization.

"There conceived theory can make us err on the principle of all principles: that all intuition that something originally given a legal basis of knowledge that everything that originally given to us (so to speak, in his bodily reality) on intuition, it must be taken simply as given, but only within the limits given. "(Ideas, 24). For Husserl, philosophy has to rely on more fundamental insights of our life: "The insights that could only be enlivened by remote printing and inaccurate, inauthentic, and assuming they were actually new about intuitions, they could not satisfy. We want to go back to things themselves. "(Logical Investigations). The same things again became a repeated theme of phenomenology.

After epojé or phenomenological reduction, which have put us fully starting field of subjectivity is the eidetic reduction. Husserl departs from empiricism to argue that there is a real intuition of essences. "An empirical intuition and individual can become essential intuition (ideation)-which in turn can not be regarded as empirical, but as essential. We sense this in this case is the corresponding pure essence or eidos, is the sum category, is a division of the same to descend to the full concreteness "(Ideas, 3). Phenomenology is now defined more strictly as eidetic description of transcendental life of me.

Lifetime transcendental ego to understand the next of experiences or phenomena originating, as absolute data to any position of importance, make possible the opening of a world consciousness. This is to capture the ultimate source of all meaning and validity can be. Husserl raises the question of how we conceive the subject to be intelligible after which the subject what is knowledge. From

intuitively grasped the essence of knowledge, which is the intentional opening of a subject to an object present, and in light of it, we must reexamine our concepts of both the reality of the subject and the reality of the object or world . All concepts, Hindus which Kant called pure concepts, must find their way originating in a transcendental subjectivity, which part any conception of both the world and oneself. This is the transcendental reduction, which Husserl agreed to its peculiar phenomenological idealism. Many of the followers of Husserl at that time were surprised of the turn to the idealism that was beginning to appear in ideas, and departed from the transcendental reflucción, running their own ways then philosophical. Husserl was left with a small group of fans. The transcendental reduction opened the way to unprecedented territory, which could have far-reaching experience and finally I could address an autonomous philosophy, radical and substantive, and would stop the spread of philosophy in philosophy. We have seen what was the position of scientistic objectivism.

"Transcendentalism, however, says the sense of being in the world of pre-given life is a subjective setting, is a product of life experience, pre-scientific life. It constructs the meaning and the validity of being in the world, and in each case in the world that really matters for which it is experienced in each case. As the world "objectively true", the science, is a creation of more Aito grade, based on experience and pre-scientific thinking, or what is equal, yields on their validity. Sólo una retro-indagación radical de la subjetividad, de la subjetividad que es precisamente la que en última instancia hace posible toda validez del mundo con su contenido y en todas las modalidades científicas y pre-científicas, así como una indagación del qué y el cómo de los rendimientos de la razón, puede hacer inteligible la verdad objetiva y alcallzar el sentido de ser último del mundo. Por consiguiente, no es el ser del mundo en su obviedad incuestionada lo en-sí primero, ni se trata de plantear la nuda interrogación sobre lo que objetivamente le pertenece; sino que lo en-sí primero es la subjetividad, y precisamente en cuanto instancia que pre-da ingenuamente el ser del mundo y seguidamente lo racionaliza. Or what is the same: the objective. "(Crisis, 14).

We are now able to highlight and understand the philosophical tension that moved Husserl throughout his work. On the one hand we have a philosophy or critical phenomenology. The critical fenomellología reality looking plots, plots that are "intuitively", "manifestly" of reality experienced in a pre-scientific experience, "and can not be explained by the conceptualizations for use in science. That is part of reality or subjective mental life trazscendental. In Crisis, Husserl called "the world of life." But the critical philosophy, we can say, has self-immolated para revelar las incongruencias del objetivismo cientificista, porque al problematizar el conocimiento y buscarle un fundamento, ha cerrado también, en principio, sus propias vías. Aquí es donde aparece el trascendentalismo kantiano y su división entre conocimiento ordinario y científico y conocimiento trascendental. Husserl, recuperando la reflexión de Kant, quiere venir a abrir una posibilidad para una filosofía sustantiva que, habiéndose hecho epojé de toda tesis, no busque ya un fundamento para el conocimiento, ni siquiera un concepto de conocimiento y trascendencia, y se limite a describir fielmente el fenómeno considerado como dato absoluto, proporcionado por una experiencia trascendental. Una buena muestra de la tension between these two ways of conceiving the philosophy would simplistically say metafísicaes theory of knowledge and in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl comes to indicate that transcendental experience also require a review that review.

One of the most famous phrases of the phenomenology is one that expresses the intentionality of consciousness, all consciousness is consciousness of something and that something is not their own conscience. Husserl establishes an indissoluble link between consciousness and its object, the so-called universal correlation objetoconciencia. Having taken the notion of intentionality of his teacher Franz Brentano, Husserl realized that one side can not be conceived no conscious experience of isolated or separated from the object to which it is addressed, it points to intentionally (and, in principle, is not the object but the intentional object), but also, on the other side, and at least as regarding its meaning, the object was not autonomous or independent of consciousness, which is the only source of meaning-giving.

For Husserl, consciousness and object are two separate entities in nature that knowledge is put into relationship. There is a correlation primitive from which subject and object are defined as such. (Quite apart from what exists or does not exist in reality, the experience is identified primarily as a fulfillment of a certain object. So to speak, the essence of the experience has a subjective side, which is the very action of consciousness while intentionally exercised, and a side goal. The objective side of experience as a essencia Husserl called noema of that experience.

Next subjective noesis of experience. There are texts of Husserl that seem to endorse the idea of \u200b\u200bthe distinction between noema and object: "The tree simply, things of nature, is anything but this perceived tree as such, which is inherent as a perceptual sense perception, and it is inseparably. The tree can simply burn, broken down into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense -The meaning of that perception, something necessarily inherent in its essence can not burn, no chemicals, no strength, no real property in the strict sense "(Ideas, 81).

about this possible separation and object noema , Husserl is the idea that not all the ingredients of consciousness are intentional. This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology was controversial and criticized by Sartre. In the non intenciollales hyle calls, raises ideas that would noesis some function of this cheerleader-feelings or content hyle representatives, to generate the corresponding noema. With this, we are almost in representationalism that Husserl himself vilified. Husserl had stressed the "personal presence" of the object to consciousness during the perception of it:

"But if we try to separate in this way, the real object (in the case of external perception, the perceived thing of nature) and the intentional object, and enter as an ingredient in the latter experience, as an "immanent" to perception, we fall into the difficulty of being now, face to face two realities in the strict sense, while, however, only We are one and only one is possible. The thing, the natural object, that is what I see, the tree that is there in the Garden, it y no otro es el objeto real de la intención perceptiva. Un segundo árbol inmanente, o bien una imagen interna del árbol que está ahí fuera ante mí, no se da en modo alguno y suponer hipotéticamente una cosa semejante sólo conduce a un contrasentido." (Ideas, 9O).

Husserl se opone a la separación entre un mundo de realidad -en-sí- correspondiente a las afirmaciones de la ciencia fisica matematizada -y un mundo de apariencias o fenómenos sensoriales meramente subjetivos. Si admitimos que la cosa sensible y sus cualidades son fenómenos subjetivos, entonces tampoco serán trascendentes las cosas en sentido fisico, puesto que son exactamente las mismas cosas que indicamos como un "esto" en la percepción Ias sensitive to the physical study of experiments in profusion around them, of deriving, applying canons of rationality lógicoempírica stable, physical determinations of the thing. With this "myth"-as Husserl calls it also falls causal theory of perception.

Thus: "Like every intentional experience has a noema and in him a sense by which refers to the object and, conversely, all that we call object, what we are talking about, which as we have before our eyes actually What we have for possible or probable, which inaccurately that we imagine to be, is only to be such an object of consciousness, and this means that are and are called world and reality and what they are called, must be represented within the framework of real conscience and possible senses or propositions, filled by the relevant content more or less intuitive (ldeas. l13).

Source: ibid. pp 554-559.
MESOGRAFÍA

Yamaha Nytro Belt Adjustment

The espitemología and recent developments.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

La epistemología es la parte más importante de la teoría de la ciencia
NOTA 1 ; implica el estudio de las ideas científicas desde el punto de vista de su validez como conocimiento.

Algunos autores prefieren llamarla filosofía de la ciencia y aun otros gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento; nosotros usaremos estos nombres indiferentemente, aunque reconocemos que algunos filósofos hacen distinciones sutiles entre los significados de estos términos.

Es necesario anotar que algunos psicólogos, como Jean Piaget, usan el término epistemología en un sentido bastante diferente al que empleamos aquí: no tanto como el estudio de la validez of knowledge but as a study of its genesis in the minds of people, especially in children.

However, to some extent the two concepts interpenetrate each other, since the development of individual minds should be in much the same way the original discovery of the ideas of humanity, so that some authors have noted a parallel between the emergence of knowledge in the individual and the species.

is important to be careful to distinguish the epistemology of the next disciplines of logic and psychology. The three disciplines have to do with knowledge, but from different viewpoints.

psychology to be discussed knowing as the psycho-physical entity, for its part, the logical thinking of studying their parts and relationships, seeking to establish formal principles of knowledge. Corresponds to epistemology instead clarifying the relationship of knowledge as a subject and an object, in particular, the elucidation of the correspondence of thought with the reality to which it refers. We also distinguish

epistemology as the study of the validity of knowledge, theory (or philosophy) of mind. The latter, with a long history in Western culture that goes back to classical Greek philosophers, seeking to understand the nature of the mind, not their ability to form valid judgments. In recent history, from the Renaissance, we see two basic positions on the subject: dualism, represented especially by René Descartes, which postulates the mind as the body of a different nature, and materialism, which regards the mind as action of a biological organ, namely, the human brain. The relations of epistemology with the theory of mind are narrower, however, that you may have with other disciplines related to knowledge. On these pages we devote to the theory of mind enough space in chapter six.

specifically now to the theory of science itself, in its recent history of this century, we can say that has gone through several distinct stages. The first decades were dominated by neo-positivism, or logical positivism, which held the great work of introducing symbolic logic or mathematical discipline. We can say that transformed radically from its traditional philosophical style in a rigorous discipline and supported by a considerable formal apparatus.

In the forties, developed a form of transition that moves away from positivism, but without abandoning the emphasis on the logical structure of scientific statements, introduced by that: it is the philosophy of science Karl Popper
and his followers rejected the idea of \u200b\u200ba logic of confirmation (or inductive logic) neopositivists feature. Instead of confirmation, the emphasis in the refutation of theories, which must prove its mettle surviving the attempt to prove they are false.

In the sixties you enter a new period, with the work of Thomas Kuhn
, which changes the emphasis from the logical structure of scientific claims to the historical experiences of these same statements. The important thing now happens to be not confirmed or rebuttal, but fidelity to scientific paradigms or abandonment. A scientific paradigm, according to Thomas Kuhn, is a major scientific breakthrough that changes the way science practitioners of the disciplines concerned. Examples are the Copernican theory and its influence on the way to practice astronomy, or the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier and the emergence, from the resulting theory of combustion, all of modern chemistry. Another paradigm of great importance is the Newtonian mechanics, which manages to unite astronomy and terrestrial mechanics in a superscience, modern physics. Still others are the doctrine of evolution postulada por Darwin y la teoría celular, que cambian en los últimos ciento cincuenta años la manera de practicar las ciencias biológicas. Podemos mencionar también como paradigmática la obra gigantesca –en nuestro siglo– de los físicos Einstein y Planck, que juntos destronaron al tan exitoso paradigma newtoniano. Finalmente, muchos autores contemporáneos hablan de un paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas para referirse a la obra de Alan Turing , que mencionamos más adelante.

En las selecciones que incluimos en este capítulo podemos ver con más detalle algunos de los aspectos de esta sucesión de teorías epistemológicas. The article by Thomas R.
Grimes is an introduction to the philosophy of science that we associate with neo-positivist or logical positivist movement. Coincides with the point of view which gives the hypothetical-deductive method of importance in the acceptance-or rejection-of a theory.

For those not familiar with the hypothetical-deductive or symbolic logic notation, we recommend deferring the study of this article after studying the article
Gutierrez and Brenes the third chapter, which introduces the method hypothetical-deductive with minimal use of logical-mathematical formalisms.

Being so new, this paper represents late neo-positivist approach that is very aware of the logical difficulties that have been raised against this epistemological approach over recent decades. At the same time, Grimes tries to underline "the basic truth" that underlies this approach, namely the idea that "a hypothesis is confirmed on the basis of their observational consequences," the author insists that merit is enough to try to save it. The article proceeds to present some important attempts to modify the original epistemological thesis, through adjustments in their respective logical theory. Shows how these attempts, which complicate the theory, not totally save her difficulties. Finally, he recommends a return to the original version, which faults the author is convinced that there are enough to dismiss it.

The text of Karl R. Popper corresponds to a stand still in the mainstream formal logic but intense reacts against neo-positivist position. Basically rejects the epistemological idea that we can confirm the truth of a hypothesis or theory with its repeated verification. With strictly logical arguments based on the contrast between ponendo modus ponens and modus tollens tollendo NOTE 2 shows how any number of observations confirmed a hypothesis would not be enough to let us accept as true, while a single observation enough to let us leave refuting false. In considering this issue, proceed to ratify the impossibility of inductive logic, as shown by the philosopher David Hume.

occasion of his entire argument, the author makes an elucidation of important terms in philosophy of science, such as those of universal statements and existential statements. Ends his argument with the thesis, very important for your epistemological position, that science really can not come to know property nothing: we can only guess. This conclusion should be taken with caution, however. The author does not intend to give this foundation to make us feel at liberty to accept any kind of conjecture: the scientific method, which involves scientists redoubled effort to demonstrate that their own theories, or those of others, are false, ensures that conjecture that survive the onslaught have shown their mettle. Only those assumptions are what we accept.

This position entails the prediction that scientists leave a hypothesis or theory always a case that is contrary or longer fulfilled a prediction. If now we consider herself as a theory, and if the prediction is that scientists abandon their theories when they encounter cases to the contrary, it is, as Thomas Kuhn, that we should reject the doctrine of Popper on behalf of herself.

Indeed, Kuhn presents in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which we have translated a selection
for this chapter, a lot of examples from the history of science in which scientists Where not otherwise accept as a refutation of their theories, but rather defend against them in a thousand different ways, the simplest is to consider them as mere anomalies, leaving them on hold for further study. Kuhn takes this as a basis for a theory of alternative science, instead of relying on the logical analysis of scientific claims, as the positivists and Popper, is based more on direct observation of historical phenomena of science and actual practice of scientific life.

The book selections Laudan note that we represent an attempt to synthesize positions contradictory and in some ways offers a test of reconciliation of thesis Popper and Kuhn. In any case, represents a more nuanced epistemology, which seeks to give weight to various factors, including the logical and historical.

One of the key problems is Laudan is the formation of scientific consensus.

For him the problem is quite complex because there are levels of knowledge in the scientific position that is necessary to distinguish: the level of the facts, the rules of the methodological and cognitive values, form a hierarchy, where the values dominate cognitive methodological rules and these facts.

Consensus can refer to any of those levels and usually disagreements are resolved at an ascending to another level where there is no disagreement. This leads us to postulate that at the highest level, that of cognitive values \u200b\u200bcan not be resolved disagreements. However, particular merit of this author, have pointed out that there is a complex process of mutual adjustment between levels and reciprocal justification "justification both flows upward and downward, linking goals, methods and assertions of fact."

The anthology continues with a very short selection
Thomas Hobbes. This quote is famous porque es el más claro ejemplo que nos provee la filosofía clásica de una declaración contundente del concepto informático de la mente. Por ella se considera a Hobbes el precursor del paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas. Para Hobbes, "razonar no es más que sacar cuentas", y todos los más complicados pensamientos se reducen a operaciones fundamentales de carácter aritmético.

Continúa nuestra selección de lecturas con una aún más breve cita de
G.W. Leibniz , el otro gran precursor del paradigma informático. Leibniz era un convencido del carácter fundamentalmente lógico de la estructura del universo. Dentro de ese espíritu, came to conceive of a mathematical language to formulate and solve any problem you can conceive, whether in the scientific field, whether in the area of \u200b\u200bhuman relations NOTE 3. In this language was called, in Latin, characteristica universalis, meaning universal categorization, method of representing all things and all situations.

The text of Alan Turing is historically important capital. This article, which appeared in 1950, represents the birth of one of the main subjects that we associate with cognitive science, namely artificial intelligence. For the first time it is played seriously in a scientific journal exotic problem if the machines may one day think. Of particular importance in relation to this article, the author is the same person who in the thirties had been a revolution in mathematics, formalizing the concept of algorithm and introduced the fruitful concept of the universal machine that bears his name, such machine was to turn the model that inspired it, in the forties, the creators of the digital computer.

Turing's analysis can be considered the culmination of a general movement towards a mechanistic, physicalist explanation of the thinking and behavior humans, as evidenced in the seventeenth century, as exemplified by the discovery of blood circulation by Harvey, Descartes' ideas about animals (whom he regarded as machines), the conception of reasoning as simple Hobbes and Leibniz calculation (88 Gandy
).

Regardless of that historical value, the article is important for two reasons. The first is that it is a description of a test, since then known as the Turing test to decide whether a machine possesses intelligence. It consists, in summary that, if a person believes he has as a partner (through a teletype machine) to another person, when in reality it is a machine that behaves like a person, then the machine is said to be intelligent (until today, no machine has been able to pass this test.) The second is that this paper presents an inventory of possible objections to the possibility of intelligence in a machine, and are refuted by the author, carefully, one by one.

this article is generally regarded as the forerunner of cognitive science in the contemporary sense. We can even say that Turing's thought, here represented, is the very paradigm of these sciences. For the first time we see it, if only implicitly, consideration of the human brain as a machine of some type, which could in principle be mimicked by a universal machine (or computer). What consequences follow from considering the human mind as an embodiment of a universal machine, just as are the computers? The consequences are extraordinary, neither more nor less than unify the cognitive sciences and bring productivity to a level never reached before by them-exactly what corresponds to an intellectual revolution as we associate with the advent of Newtonian paradigm or Lavoisier or Darwin.

By exploring these implications, we must take into account two ambiguities in machine design. When we say that a Turing machine can emulate any other machine we must assume that if the machine is not simply imitated an abstract machine (mathematically defined) but a particular machine, the Turing machine must be done physically and have effector organs and sensitivity that enable them to perform practical tasks. The second ambiguity that must be cleared has to do with the pejorative connotation that we normally associate with the word machine. Oppose the terms "mechanical" and "vital" as rigid to flexible, adaptable to the insensible, the grotesque and the humorous. But none of that is valid against the plasticity of the new machines related to electronics, appliances quintessential flexible and adaptable to circumstances. This idea of \u200b\u200ba new machine concept is broad and brilliantly analyzed by Marvin Minsky in his book The Society of Mind, which included a selection
representative as the culmination of the chapter.

NOTE 1 Other parts of the theory of science that are not epistemology are, for example, sociology of science or the history of science.

NOTE 2 Visit Gutierrez and Brenes article in the third chapter of this collection to better understand this opposition.

NOTE 3 famously Leibniz diplomatic interventions in the Europe of his time seeking the settlement of international peace.
Source: pg. Id. 542-545.
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