Husserl's phenomenology: LEARNING TO SEE
We take our destiny in their hands, we become responsible for our history through reflection, but also by a decision to commit our life, and in both cases, is a violent act that is verified by exercising. Merlau-Ponty
Discuss phenomenology, the philosophical movement created by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is almost as much as talk about the philosophy of the twentieth century, and I think you can point out two reasons in support of that view. First, if you look away from the concrete formulations that Husserl gave his ideas, many philosophers of our century have acknowledged the influence of Husserl in a greater or lesser degree. Heidegger was a direct disciple of Husserl, and he learned a certain style of philosophizing, but soon came the theoretical differences. Sartre, in the thirties, he discovered the author in ideas relating to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, which is the most popular exhibition that Husserl did a theory. The influence on Sartre is notorious. Some authors critical of the twentieth century, as Merleau-Ponty, have belonged to phenomenology. The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur finds its starting point in Husserl. And we could even go further and share the view Montero defending Miller (in Return to phenomenology) that, for those who understand ideas and not schools, analytic philosophy of language and participate in the same spirit of phenomenology. Authors such as Strawson, Austin, Searle and Grice are relatives of phenomenology without forcing a lot of comparisons.
more complicated view is presented Gerd Brand (in the key texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein) that Wittgenstein would phenomenologist par excellence.
philosophical movement created by Husserl has been growing and branching out with over the years. To get a good idea de la increíble amplitud del árbol fenomenológico que casi no deja una ciencia ni una disciplina filosófica sin cubrir- puede consultarse con la obra de Bernhard Waldenfels (Introducción a la fenomenología. De Husserl a Derrida). La fenomenología es una filosofía viva, se publican anales y revistas, se dan congresos y seminarios. ¿Cuál puede ser el motivo de este éxito de la fenomenología? Para responder a esta pregunta, entramos en la segunda razón. Ya uno de los primeros discípulos de Husserl, Adolf Reinach, había señalado que la fenomenología, más que un sistema de doctrinas filosóficas, era un método. Y un método que además envuelve un desarrollo ilimitado por principle.
This is the meaning of the title I gave to my article: phenomenology as an attempt to establish the conditions of possibility of philosophy as an attempt to show the road to see the world in a philosophical manner. In an effort to reflect metaphilosophical, Husserl sought a place for philosophy, a place that no one but she could fill, and almost exhausted its energies in that effort. For that reason, leaving aside the false radicalism metaphilosophical, phenomenology as a philosophical theory just opts for precise thesis: while one might almost say that everything that falls under the heading "philosophy made a serious effort and rigor "can be considered as" phenomenology. "Moreover, Husserl being the initiator of the current, is partly understandable that his philosophy is affected by all the hesitation characteristic of exploring new ground. Husserl , who was a man steeped in theory and overly scrupulous, again and again about their own ideas, and tried several times to fully expose, adding more and more detail, complicating the terminology. At his death left more than 45,000 pages shorthand and I think that still publish their works under the title of Husserl.
However, it was considered a novice of philosophy, which had only ventured into the trails of the vast territory that opened the phenomenological method. But do not forget when we read Husserl, that this philosophy confusing, incomplete and sometimes contradictory, was the inspiration for great works of the twentieth century, full of ideas perhaps more clear and attractive, and that debt either theoretical or critical debate with it, there are many philosophers of our century who have gone through phenomenology and have helped to develop and qualify it with their theories. So I think that understanding is necessary to understand Husserl our century, at least philosophically. In this article we will, in as far as possible, closer to this understanding.
Phenomenology in Logical Investigations was born as a refutation of psychologism. Psychologism intended as a way to solve some problems posed by the theory of knowledge and science, without departing from the narrow confines of positivism "facts." The idea of \u200b\u200bpsychologism was to be a certain composition of place, off the ground without common sense of his time to get the advantage thus an appearance of immediate intelligibility. Then, is airing the theory of knowledge, pretending that paradoxes were discovered not only the result of dark philosophemes. The composition of place that I mentioned is this: we start by accepting the reality of a world of objects as something comprehensible in itself, as an impassable horizon beyond which no question is meaningless. Within that world of objects placed the human being as an object among objects, however, the human being we find a very peculiar object. What is consciousness or mental life by which this object represents all the others? Is it a property of that object? In our positivist world objects can only support the casual link and relationship between objects.
Can you explain perhaps the knowledge as a causal influence an object on another object? Psychologism yielded to the temptation Cartesian conception of consciousness or mental life as a thing, a substantial reality. In the last decades of the nineteenth century had been established psychology as a science, to prove that it was possible to apply the experimental method to study the mental life of animals and humans. And from his birth until much later, psychology, intended to become a real "physics of the soul", a claim which is strongly criticized by Husserl, according to our author, could never be reached just this conception of the subject-while-knower while trying to follow him to exhaust in all its nuances through an empirical science underlying intent under which the biased view of him as an object among objects. It was totally absurd
the alleged final foundation of knowledge by psychology, arguing that knowledge should be seen as a psychological event, and that the mystery will finally be enlightened by scientific reason. Given that from the time of Descartes's theory of knowledge had been the bulwark of the possibility and necessity of philosophical reflection, to be solved his "problems" with a science as psychology, philosophy was not "work" and Therefore, without "meaning." But the psychologist had gone too far: when trying to close the circle of scientific objectivity about himself, all he got was to highlight the very limits of all knowledge.
theory of knowledge could not be overcome by psychological research because it was knowledge. Neither the logic could be reduced to laws governing only the human psyche, since psychology was the logic for granted in its reasoning. "The specific relativism makes this claim: for each species of beings capable of judging what is true according to its constitution or under the laws of thought be taken as true ... the formation of a species is a fact. And facts can be learned only facts. Found the truth in the establishment of a sort ... means to give, then, the character of a fact.
But this is a contradiction. Every event is individual, that is, determined at the time. But talk of a temporary truth only makes sense referring to a fact stated by it (if it is indeed true) but not referring to herself. "(Logical Investigations, Part I, chap. VII). The root of the problem was-it may seem like gibberish, in a misconception of what a concept. In a way the human mind is not made in regular operation, or the absolute stillness of the concepts nor the fleeting sensations. So when Husserl proposes a philosophical journey to the bottom of the concept, considering it as such a concept, completely apart to find out anything about their nature or reality, and pursuing pure connections between concepts in a domain where the queen just complete isolation and loneliness among conceptual entities themselves perfectly identical, we find a breath of fresh air to the opposite theory that takes the concepts in their surface reality of mental events, without getting into the Honduras of its meaning, and will explain its occurrence through a genetic process.
But Husserl considered that there should be a purely conceptual theory of knowledge: therefore could not be used not one of knowledge already established. That is the meaning that has its famous epojé (suspension of the trial) or phenomenological reduction. To study the experiences as such, must change our ordinary way of living them. Husserl describes this as ordinary or natural attitude as a direct and naive point of consciousness to the world and its objects, such as attention and interest in them.
The natural attitude is charged with tacitly accepted as valid interpretations of prejudice, of confusing intellectualizations leading to lack of understanding.
epojé The result of the phenomenal is that our attention shifts to objects by way of giving these objects in consciousness, that is, phenomena in the phenomenological sense. Then the phenomenologist only accept as valid those phenomena that are given two originally, and are the basis for all subsequent interpretation and intellectualization.
"There conceived theory can make us err on the principle of all principles: that all intuition that something originally given a legal basis of knowledge that everything that originally given to us (so to speak, in his bodily reality) on intuition, it must be taken simply as given, but only within the limits given. "(Ideas, 24). For Husserl, philosophy has to rely on more fundamental insights of our life: "The insights that could only be enlivened by remote printing and inaccurate, inauthentic, and assuming they were actually new about intuitions, they could not satisfy. We want to go back to things themselves. "(Logical Investigations). The same things again became a repeated theme of phenomenology.
After epojé or phenomenological reduction, which have put us fully starting field of subjectivity is the eidetic reduction. Husserl departs from empiricism to argue that there is a real intuition of essences. "An empirical intuition and individual can become essential intuition (ideation)-which in turn can not be regarded as empirical, but as essential. We sense this in this case is the corresponding pure essence or eidos, is the sum category, is a division of the same to descend to the full concreteness "(Ideas, 3). Phenomenology is now defined more strictly as eidetic description of transcendental life of me.
Lifetime transcendental ego to understand the next of experiences or phenomena originating, as absolute data to any position of importance, make possible the opening of a world consciousness. This is to capture the ultimate source of all meaning and validity can be. Husserl raises the question of how we conceive the subject to be intelligible after which the subject what is knowledge. From
intuitively grasped the essence of knowledge, which is the intentional opening of a subject to an object present, and in light of it, we must reexamine our concepts of both the reality of the subject and the reality of the object or world . All concepts, Hindus which Kant called pure concepts, must find their way originating in a transcendental subjectivity, which part any conception of both the world and oneself. This is the transcendental reduction, which Husserl agreed to its peculiar phenomenological idealism. Many of the followers of Husserl at that time were surprised of the turn to the idealism that was beginning to appear in ideas, and departed from the transcendental reflucción, running their own ways then philosophical. Husserl was left with a small group of fans. The transcendental reduction opened the way to unprecedented territory, which could have far-reaching experience and finally I could address an autonomous philosophy, radical and substantive, and would stop the spread of philosophy in philosophy. We have seen what was the position of scientistic objectivism.
"Transcendentalism, however, says the sense of being in the world of pre-given life is a subjective setting, is a product of life experience, pre-scientific life. It constructs the meaning and the validity of being in the world, and in each case in the world that really matters for which it is experienced in each case. As the world "objectively true", the science, is a creation of more Aito grade, based on experience and pre-scientific thinking, or what is equal, yields on their validity. Sólo una retro-indagación radical de la subjetividad, de la subjetividad que es precisamente la que en última instancia hace posible toda validez del mundo con su contenido y en todas las modalidades científicas y pre-científicas, así como una indagación del qué y el cómo de los rendimientos de la razón, puede hacer inteligible la verdad objetiva y alcallzar el sentido de ser último del mundo. Por consiguiente, no es el ser del mundo en su obviedad incuestionada lo en-sí primero, ni se trata de plantear la nuda interrogación sobre lo que objetivamente le pertenece; sino que lo en-sí primero es la subjetividad, y precisamente en cuanto instancia que pre-da ingenuamente el ser del mundo y seguidamente lo racionaliza. Or what is the same: the objective. "(Crisis, 14).
We are now able to highlight and understand the philosophical tension that moved Husserl throughout his work. On the one hand we have a philosophy or critical phenomenology. The critical fenomellología reality looking plots, plots that are "intuitively", "manifestly" of reality experienced in a pre-scientific experience, "and can not be explained by the conceptualizations for use in science. That is part of reality or subjective mental life trazscendental. In Crisis, Husserl called "the world of life." But the critical philosophy, we can say, has self-immolated para revelar las incongruencias del objetivismo cientificista, porque al problematizar el conocimiento y buscarle un fundamento, ha cerrado también, en principio, sus propias vías. Aquí es donde aparece el trascendentalismo kantiano y su división entre conocimiento ordinario y científico y conocimiento trascendental. Husserl, recuperando la reflexión de Kant, quiere venir a abrir una posibilidad para una filosofía sustantiva que, habiéndose hecho epojé de toda tesis, no busque ya un fundamento para el conocimiento, ni siquiera un concepto de conocimiento y trascendencia, y se limite a describir fielmente el fenómeno considerado como dato absoluto, proporcionado por una experiencia trascendental. Una buena muestra de la tension between these two ways of conceiving the philosophy would simplistically say metafísicaes theory of knowledge and in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl comes to indicate that transcendental experience also require a review that review.
One of the most famous phrases of the phenomenology is one that expresses the intentionality of consciousness, all consciousness is consciousness of something and that something is not their own conscience. Husserl establishes an indissoluble link between consciousness and its object, the so-called universal correlation objetoconciencia. Having taken the notion of intentionality of his teacher Franz Brentano, Husserl realized that one side can not be conceived no conscious experience of isolated or separated from the object to which it is addressed, it points to intentionally (and, in principle, is not the object but the intentional object), but also, on the other side, and at least as regarding its meaning, the object was not autonomous or independent of consciousness, which is the only source of meaning-giving.
For Husserl, consciousness and object are two separate entities in nature that knowledge is put into relationship. There is a correlation primitive from which subject and object are defined as such. (Quite apart from what exists or does not exist in reality, the experience is identified primarily as a fulfillment of a certain object. So to speak, the essence of the experience has a subjective side, which is the very action of consciousness while intentionally exercised, and a side goal. The objective side of experience as a essencia Husserl called noema of that experience.
Next subjective noesis of experience. There are texts of Husserl that seem to endorse the idea of \u200b\u200bthe distinction between noema and object: "The tree simply, things of nature, is anything but this perceived tree as such, which is inherent as a perceptual sense perception, and it is inseparably. The tree can simply burn, broken down into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense -The meaning of that perception, something necessarily inherent in its essence can not burn, no chemicals, no strength, no real property in the strict sense "(Ideas, 81).
about this possible separation and object noema , Husserl is the idea that not all the ingredients of consciousness are intentional. This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology was controversial and criticized by Sartre. In the non intenciollales hyle calls, raises ideas that would noesis some function of this cheerleader-feelings or content hyle representatives, to generate the corresponding noema. With this, we are almost in representationalism that Husserl himself vilified. Husserl had stressed the "personal presence" of the object to consciousness during the perception of it:
"But if we try to separate in this way, the real object (in the case of external perception, the perceived thing of nature) and the intentional object, and enter as an ingredient in the latter experience, as an "immanent" to perception, we fall into the difficulty of being now, face to face two realities in the strict sense, while, however, only We are one and only one is possible. The thing, the natural object, that is what I see, the tree that is there in the Garden, it y no otro es el objeto real de la intención perceptiva. Un segundo árbol inmanente, o bien una imagen interna del árbol que está ahí fuera ante mí, no se da en modo alguno y suponer hipotéticamente una cosa semejante sólo conduce a un contrasentido." (Ideas, 9O).
Husserl se opone a la separación entre un mundo de realidad -en-sí- correspondiente a las afirmaciones de la ciencia fisica matematizada -y un mundo de apariencias o fenómenos sensoriales meramente subjetivos. Si admitimos que la cosa sensible y sus cualidades son fenómenos subjetivos, entonces tampoco serán trascendentes las cosas en sentido fisico, puesto que son exactamente las mismas cosas que indicamos como un "esto" en la percepción Ias sensitive to the physical study of experiments in profusion around them, of deriving, applying canons of rationality lógicoempírica stable, physical determinations of the thing. With this "myth"-as Husserl calls it also falls causal theory of perception.
Thus: "Like every intentional experience has a noema and in him a sense by which refers to the object and, conversely, all that we call object, what we are talking about, which as we have before our eyes actually What we have for possible or probable, which inaccurately that we imagine to be, is only to be such an object of consciousness, and this means that are and are called world and reality and what they are called, must be represented within the framework of real conscience and possible senses or propositions, filled by the relevant content more or less intuitive (ldeas. l13).
We take our destiny in their hands, we become responsible for our history through reflection, but also by a decision to commit our life, and in both cases, is a violent act that is verified by exercising. Merlau-Ponty
Discuss phenomenology, the philosophical movement created by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is almost as much as talk about the philosophy of the twentieth century, and I think you can point out two reasons in support of that view. First, if you look away from the concrete formulations that Husserl gave his ideas, many philosophers of our century have acknowledged the influence of Husserl in a greater or lesser degree. Heidegger was a direct disciple of Husserl, and he learned a certain style of philosophizing, but soon came the theoretical differences. Sartre, in the thirties, he discovered the author in ideas relating to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, which is the most popular exhibition that Husserl did a theory. The influence on Sartre is notorious. Some authors critical of the twentieth century, as Merleau-Ponty, have belonged to phenomenology. The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur finds its starting point in Husserl. And we could even go further and share the view Montero defending Miller (in Return to phenomenology) that, for those who understand ideas and not schools, analytic philosophy of language and participate in the same spirit of phenomenology. Authors such as Strawson, Austin, Searle and Grice are relatives of phenomenology without forcing a lot of comparisons.
more complicated view is presented Gerd Brand (in the key texts of Ludwig Wittgenstein) that Wittgenstein would phenomenologist par excellence.
philosophical movement created by Husserl has been growing and branching out with over the years. To get a good idea de la increíble amplitud del árbol fenomenológico que casi no deja una ciencia ni una disciplina filosófica sin cubrir- puede consultarse con la obra de Bernhard Waldenfels (Introducción a la fenomenología. De Husserl a Derrida). La fenomenología es una filosofía viva, se publican anales y revistas, se dan congresos y seminarios. ¿Cuál puede ser el motivo de este éxito de la fenomenología? Para responder a esta pregunta, entramos en la segunda razón. Ya uno de los primeros discípulos de Husserl, Adolf Reinach, había señalado que la fenomenología, más que un sistema de doctrinas filosóficas, era un método. Y un método que además envuelve un desarrollo ilimitado por principle.
This is the meaning of the title I gave to my article: phenomenology as an attempt to establish the conditions of possibility of philosophy as an attempt to show the road to see the world in a philosophical manner. In an effort to reflect metaphilosophical, Husserl sought a place for philosophy, a place that no one but she could fill, and almost exhausted its energies in that effort. For that reason, leaving aside the false radicalism metaphilosophical, phenomenology as a philosophical theory just opts for precise thesis: while one might almost say that everything that falls under the heading "philosophy made a serious effort and rigor "can be considered as" phenomenology. "Moreover, Husserl being the initiator of the current, is partly understandable that his philosophy is affected by all the hesitation characteristic of exploring new ground. Husserl , who was a man steeped in theory and overly scrupulous, again and again about their own ideas, and tried several times to fully expose, adding more and more detail, complicating the terminology. At his death left more than 45,000 pages shorthand and I think that still publish their works under the title of Husserl.
However, it was considered a novice of philosophy, which had only ventured into the trails of the vast territory that opened the phenomenological method. But do not forget when we read Husserl, that this philosophy confusing, incomplete and sometimes contradictory, was the inspiration for great works of the twentieth century, full of ideas perhaps more clear and attractive, and that debt either theoretical or critical debate with it, there are many philosophers of our century who have gone through phenomenology and have helped to develop and qualify it with their theories. So I think that understanding is necessary to understand Husserl our century, at least philosophically. In this article we will, in as far as possible, closer to this understanding.
Phenomenology in Logical Investigations was born as a refutation of psychologism. Psychologism intended as a way to solve some problems posed by the theory of knowledge and science, without departing from the narrow confines of positivism "facts." The idea of \u200b\u200bpsychologism was to be a certain composition of place, off the ground without common sense of his time to get the advantage thus an appearance of immediate intelligibility. Then, is airing the theory of knowledge, pretending that paradoxes were discovered not only the result of dark philosophemes. The composition of place that I mentioned is this: we start by accepting the reality of a world of objects as something comprehensible in itself, as an impassable horizon beyond which no question is meaningless. Within that world of objects placed the human being as an object among objects, however, the human being we find a very peculiar object. What is consciousness or mental life by which this object represents all the others? Is it a property of that object? In our positivist world objects can only support the casual link and relationship between objects.
Can you explain perhaps the knowledge as a causal influence an object on another object? Psychologism yielded to the temptation Cartesian conception of consciousness or mental life as a thing, a substantial reality. In the last decades of the nineteenth century had been established psychology as a science, to prove that it was possible to apply the experimental method to study the mental life of animals and humans. And from his birth until much later, psychology, intended to become a real "physics of the soul", a claim which is strongly criticized by Husserl, according to our author, could never be reached just this conception of the subject-while-knower while trying to follow him to exhaust in all its nuances through an empirical science underlying intent under which the biased view of him as an object among objects. It was totally absurd
the alleged final foundation of knowledge by psychology, arguing that knowledge should be seen as a psychological event, and that the mystery will finally be enlightened by scientific reason. Given that from the time of Descartes's theory of knowledge had been the bulwark of the possibility and necessity of philosophical reflection, to be solved his "problems" with a science as psychology, philosophy was not "work" and Therefore, without "meaning." But the psychologist had gone too far: when trying to close the circle of scientific objectivity about himself, all he got was to highlight the very limits of all knowledge.
theory of knowledge could not be overcome by psychological research because it was knowledge. Neither the logic could be reduced to laws governing only the human psyche, since psychology was the logic for granted in its reasoning. "The specific relativism makes this claim: for each species of beings capable of judging what is true according to its constitution or under the laws of thought be taken as true ... the formation of a species is a fact. And facts can be learned only facts. Found the truth in the establishment of a sort ... means to give, then, the character of a fact.
But this is a contradiction. Every event is individual, that is, determined at the time. But talk of a temporary truth only makes sense referring to a fact stated by it (if it is indeed true) but not referring to herself. "(Logical Investigations, Part I, chap. VII). The root of the problem was-it may seem like gibberish, in a misconception of what a concept. In a way the human mind is not made in regular operation, or the absolute stillness of the concepts nor the fleeting sensations. So when Husserl proposes a philosophical journey to the bottom of the concept, considering it as such a concept, completely apart to find out anything about their nature or reality, and pursuing pure connections between concepts in a domain where the queen just complete isolation and loneliness among conceptual entities themselves perfectly identical, we find a breath of fresh air to the opposite theory that takes the concepts in their surface reality of mental events, without getting into the Honduras of its meaning, and will explain its occurrence through a genetic process.
But Husserl considered that there should be a purely conceptual theory of knowledge: therefore could not be used not one of knowledge already established. That is the meaning that has its famous epojé (suspension of the trial) or phenomenological reduction. To study the experiences as such, must change our ordinary way of living them. Husserl describes this as ordinary or natural attitude as a direct and naive point of consciousness to the world and its objects, such as attention and interest in them.
The natural attitude is charged with tacitly accepted as valid interpretations of prejudice, of confusing intellectualizations leading to lack of understanding.
epojé The result of the phenomenal is that our attention shifts to objects by way of giving these objects in consciousness, that is, phenomena in the phenomenological sense. Then the phenomenologist only accept as valid those phenomena that are given two originally, and are the basis for all subsequent interpretation and intellectualization.
"There conceived theory can make us err on the principle of all principles: that all intuition that something originally given a legal basis of knowledge that everything that originally given to us (so to speak, in his bodily reality) on intuition, it must be taken simply as given, but only within the limits given. "(Ideas, 24). For Husserl, philosophy has to rely on more fundamental insights of our life: "The insights that could only be enlivened by remote printing and inaccurate, inauthentic, and assuming they were actually new about intuitions, they could not satisfy. We want to go back to things themselves. "(Logical Investigations). The same things again became a repeated theme of phenomenology.
After epojé or phenomenological reduction, which have put us fully starting field of subjectivity is the eidetic reduction. Husserl departs from empiricism to argue that there is a real intuition of essences. "An empirical intuition and individual can become essential intuition (ideation)-which in turn can not be regarded as empirical, but as essential. We sense this in this case is the corresponding pure essence or eidos, is the sum category, is a division of the same to descend to the full concreteness "(Ideas, 3). Phenomenology is now defined more strictly as eidetic description of transcendental life of me.
Lifetime transcendental ego to understand the next of experiences or phenomena originating, as absolute data to any position of importance, make possible the opening of a world consciousness. This is to capture the ultimate source of all meaning and validity can be. Husserl raises the question of how we conceive the subject to be intelligible after which the subject what is knowledge. From
intuitively grasped the essence of knowledge, which is the intentional opening of a subject to an object present, and in light of it, we must reexamine our concepts of both the reality of the subject and the reality of the object or world . All concepts, Hindus which Kant called pure concepts, must find their way originating in a transcendental subjectivity, which part any conception of both the world and oneself. This is the transcendental reduction, which Husserl agreed to its peculiar phenomenological idealism. Many of the followers of Husserl at that time were surprised of the turn to the idealism that was beginning to appear in ideas, and departed from the transcendental reflucción, running their own ways then philosophical. Husserl was left with a small group of fans. The transcendental reduction opened the way to unprecedented territory, which could have far-reaching experience and finally I could address an autonomous philosophy, radical and substantive, and would stop the spread of philosophy in philosophy. We have seen what was the position of scientistic objectivism.
"Transcendentalism, however, says the sense of being in the world of pre-given life is a subjective setting, is a product of life experience, pre-scientific life. It constructs the meaning and the validity of being in the world, and in each case in the world that really matters for which it is experienced in each case. As the world "objectively true", the science, is a creation of more Aito grade, based on experience and pre-scientific thinking, or what is equal, yields on their validity. Sólo una retro-indagación radical de la subjetividad, de la subjetividad que es precisamente la que en última instancia hace posible toda validez del mundo con su contenido y en todas las modalidades científicas y pre-científicas, así como una indagación del qué y el cómo de los rendimientos de la razón, puede hacer inteligible la verdad objetiva y alcallzar el sentido de ser último del mundo. Por consiguiente, no es el ser del mundo en su obviedad incuestionada lo en-sí primero, ni se trata de plantear la nuda interrogación sobre lo que objetivamente le pertenece; sino que lo en-sí primero es la subjetividad, y precisamente en cuanto instancia que pre-da ingenuamente el ser del mundo y seguidamente lo racionaliza. Or what is the same: the objective. "(Crisis, 14).
We are now able to highlight and understand the philosophical tension that moved Husserl throughout his work. On the one hand we have a philosophy or critical phenomenology. The critical fenomellología reality looking plots, plots that are "intuitively", "manifestly" of reality experienced in a pre-scientific experience, "and can not be explained by the conceptualizations for use in science. That is part of reality or subjective mental life trazscendental. In Crisis, Husserl called "the world of life." But the critical philosophy, we can say, has self-immolated para revelar las incongruencias del objetivismo cientificista, porque al problematizar el conocimiento y buscarle un fundamento, ha cerrado también, en principio, sus propias vías. Aquí es donde aparece el trascendentalismo kantiano y su división entre conocimiento ordinario y científico y conocimiento trascendental. Husserl, recuperando la reflexión de Kant, quiere venir a abrir una posibilidad para una filosofía sustantiva que, habiéndose hecho epojé de toda tesis, no busque ya un fundamento para el conocimiento, ni siquiera un concepto de conocimiento y trascendencia, y se limite a describir fielmente el fenómeno considerado como dato absoluto, proporcionado por una experiencia trascendental. Una buena muestra de la tension between these two ways of conceiving the philosophy would simplistically say metafísicaes theory of knowledge and in the Cartesian Meditations Husserl comes to indicate that transcendental experience also require a review that review.
One of the most famous phrases of the phenomenology is one that expresses the intentionality of consciousness, all consciousness is consciousness of something and that something is not their own conscience. Husserl establishes an indissoluble link between consciousness and its object, the so-called universal correlation objetoconciencia. Having taken the notion of intentionality of his teacher Franz Brentano, Husserl realized that one side can not be conceived no conscious experience of isolated or separated from the object to which it is addressed, it points to intentionally (and, in principle, is not the object but the intentional object), but also, on the other side, and at least as regarding its meaning, the object was not autonomous or independent of consciousness, which is the only source of meaning-giving.
For Husserl, consciousness and object are two separate entities in nature that knowledge is put into relationship. There is a correlation primitive from which subject and object are defined as such. (Quite apart from what exists or does not exist in reality, the experience is identified primarily as a fulfillment of a certain object. So to speak, the essence of the experience has a subjective side, which is the very action of consciousness while intentionally exercised, and a side goal. The objective side of experience as a essencia Husserl called noema of that experience.
Next subjective noesis of experience. There are texts of Husserl that seem to endorse the idea of \u200b\u200bthe distinction between noema and object: "The tree simply, things of nature, is anything but this perceived tree as such, which is inherent as a perceptual sense perception, and it is inseparably. The tree can simply burn, broken down into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense -The meaning of that perception, something necessarily inherent in its essence can not burn, no chemicals, no strength, no real property in the strict sense "(Ideas, 81).
about this possible separation and object noema , Husserl is the idea that not all the ingredients of consciousness are intentional. This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology was controversial and criticized by Sartre. In the non intenciollales hyle calls, raises ideas that would noesis some function of this cheerleader-feelings or content hyle representatives, to generate the corresponding noema. With this, we are almost in representationalism that Husserl himself vilified. Husserl had stressed the "personal presence" of the object to consciousness during the perception of it:
"But if we try to separate in this way, the real object (in the case of external perception, the perceived thing of nature) and the intentional object, and enter as an ingredient in the latter experience, as an "immanent" to perception, we fall into the difficulty of being now, face to face two realities in the strict sense, while, however, only We are one and only one is possible. The thing, the natural object, that is what I see, the tree that is there in the Garden, it y no otro es el objeto real de la intención perceptiva. Un segundo árbol inmanente, o bien una imagen interna del árbol que está ahí fuera ante mí, no se da en modo alguno y suponer hipotéticamente una cosa semejante sólo conduce a un contrasentido." (Ideas, 9O).
Husserl se opone a la separación entre un mundo de realidad -en-sí- correspondiente a las afirmaciones de la ciencia fisica matematizada -y un mundo de apariencias o fenómenos sensoriales meramente subjetivos. Si admitimos que la cosa sensible y sus cualidades son fenómenos subjetivos, entonces tampoco serán trascendentes las cosas en sentido fisico, puesto que son exactamente las mismas cosas que indicamos como un "esto" en la percepción Ias sensitive to the physical study of experiments in profusion around them, of deriving, applying canons of rationality lógicoempírica stable, physical determinations of the thing. With this "myth"-as Husserl calls it also falls causal theory of perception.
Thus: "Like every intentional experience has a noema and in him a sense by which refers to the object and, conversely, all that we call object, what we are talking about, which as we have before our eyes actually What we have for possible or probable, which inaccurately that we imagine to be, is only to be such an object of consciousness, and this means that are and are called world and reality and what they are called, must be represented within the framework of real conscience and possible senses or propositions, filled by the relevant content more or less intuitive (ldeas. l13).
Source: ibid. pp 554-559.
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