THE EPISTEMOLOGY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
La epistemología es la parte más importante de la teoría de la ciencia NOTA 1 ; implica el estudio de las ideas científicas desde el punto de vista de su validez como conocimiento.
Algunos autores prefieren llamarla filosofía de la ciencia y aun otros gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento; nosotros usaremos estos nombres indiferentemente, aunque reconocemos que algunos filósofos hacen distinciones sutiles entre los significados de estos términos.
Es necesario anotar que algunos psicólogos, como Jean Piaget, usan el término epistemología en un sentido bastante diferente al que empleamos aquí: no tanto como el estudio de la validez of knowledge but as a study of its genesis in the minds of people, especially in children.
However, to some extent the two concepts interpenetrate each other, since the development of individual minds should be in much the same way the original discovery of the ideas of humanity, so that some authors have noted a parallel between the emergence of knowledge in the individual and the species.
is important to be careful to distinguish the epistemology of the next disciplines of logic and psychology. The three disciplines have to do with knowledge, but from different viewpoints.
psychology to be discussed knowing as the psycho-physical entity, for its part, the logical thinking of studying their parts and relationships, seeking to establish formal principles of knowledge. Corresponds to epistemology instead clarifying the relationship of knowledge as a subject and an object, in particular, the elucidation of the correspondence of thought with the reality to which it refers. We also distinguish
epistemology as the study of the validity of knowledge, theory (or philosophy) of mind. The latter, with a long history in Western culture that goes back to classical Greek philosophers, seeking to understand the nature of the mind, not their ability to form valid judgments. In recent history, from the Renaissance, we see two basic positions on the subject: dualism, represented especially by René Descartes, which postulates the mind as the body of a different nature, and materialism, which regards the mind as action of a biological organ, namely, the human brain. The relations of epistemology with the theory of mind are narrower, however, that you may have with other disciplines related to knowledge. On these pages we devote to the theory of mind enough space in chapter six.
specifically now to the theory of science itself, in its recent history of this century, we can say that has gone through several distinct stages. The first decades were dominated by neo-positivism, or logical positivism, which held the great work of introducing symbolic logic or mathematical discipline. We can say that transformed radically from its traditional philosophical style in a rigorous discipline and supported by a considerable formal apparatus.
In the forties, developed a form of transition that moves away from positivism, but without abandoning the emphasis on the logical structure of scientific statements, introduced by that: it is the philosophy of science Karl Popper and his followers rejected the idea of \u200b\u200ba logic of confirmation (or inductive logic) neopositivists feature. Instead of confirmation, the emphasis in the refutation of theories, which must prove its mettle surviving the attempt to prove they are false.
In the sixties you enter a new period, with the work of Thomas Kuhn , which changes the emphasis from the logical structure of scientific claims to the historical experiences of these same statements. The important thing now happens to be not confirmed or rebuttal, but fidelity to scientific paradigms or abandonment. A scientific paradigm, according to Thomas Kuhn, is a major scientific breakthrough that changes the way science practitioners of the disciplines concerned. Examples are the Copernican theory and its influence on the way to practice astronomy, or the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier and the emergence, from the resulting theory of combustion, all of modern chemistry. Another paradigm of great importance is the Newtonian mechanics, which manages to unite astronomy and terrestrial mechanics in a superscience, modern physics. Still others are the doctrine of evolution postulada por Darwin y la teoría celular, que cambian en los últimos ciento cincuenta años la manera de practicar las ciencias biológicas. Podemos mencionar también como paradigmática la obra gigantesca –en nuestro siglo– de los físicos Einstein y Planck, que juntos destronaron al tan exitoso paradigma newtoniano. Finalmente, muchos autores contemporáneos hablan de un paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas para referirse a la obra de Alan Turing , que mencionamos más adelante.
En las selecciones que incluimos en este capítulo podemos ver con más detalle algunos de los aspectos de esta sucesión de teorías epistemológicas. The article by Thomas R. Grimes is an introduction to the philosophy of science that we associate with neo-positivist or logical positivist movement. Coincides with the point of view which gives the hypothetical-deductive method of importance in the acceptance-or rejection-of a theory.
For those not familiar with the hypothetical-deductive or symbolic logic notation, we recommend deferring the study of this article after studying the article Gutierrez and Brenes the third chapter, which introduces the method hypothetical-deductive with minimal use of logical-mathematical formalisms.
Being so new, this paper represents late neo-positivist approach that is very aware of the logical difficulties that have been raised against this epistemological approach over recent decades. At the same time, Grimes tries to underline "the basic truth" that underlies this approach, namely the idea that "a hypothesis is confirmed on the basis of their observational consequences," the author insists that merit is enough to try to save it. The article proceeds to present some important attempts to modify the original epistemological thesis, through adjustments in their respective logical theory. Shows how these attempts, which complicate the theory, not totally save her difficulties. Finally, he recommends a return to the original version, which faults the author is convinced that there are enough to dismiss it.
The text of Karl R. Popper corresponds to a stand still in the mainstream formal logic but intense reacts against neo-positivist position. Basically rejects the epistemological idea that we can confirm the truth of a hypothesis or theory with its repeated verification. With strictly logical arguments based on the contrast between ponendo modus ponens and modus tollens tollendo NOTE 2 shows how any number of observations confirmed a hypothesis would not be enough to let us accept as true, while a single observation enough to let us leave refuting false. In considering this issue, proceed to ratify the impossibility of inductive logic, as shown by the philosopher David Hume.
occasion of his entire argument, the author makes an elucidation of important terms in philosophy of science, such as those of universal statements and existential statements. Ends his argument with the thesis, very important for your epistemological position, that science really can not come to know property nothing: we can only guess. This conclusion should be taken with caution, however. The author does not intend to give this foundation to make us feel at liberty to accept any kind of conjecture: the scientific method, which involves scientists redoubled effort to demonstrate that their own theories, or those of others, are false, ensures that conjecture that survive the onslaught have shown their mettle. Only those assumptions are what we accept.
This position entails the prediction that scientists leave a hypothesis or theory always a case that is contrary or longer fulfilled a prediction. If now we consider herself as a theory, and if the prediction is that scientists abandon their theories when they encounter cases to the contrary, it is, as Thomas Kuhn, that we should reject the doctrine of Popper on behalf of herself.
Indeed, Kuhn presents in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which we have translated a selection for this chapter, a lot of examples from the history of science in which scientists Where not otherwise accept as a refutation of their theories, but rather defend against them in a thousand different ways, the simplest is to consider them as mere anomalies, leaving them on hold for further study. Kuhn takes this as a basis for a theory of alternative science, instead of relying on the logical analysis of scientific claims, as the positivists and Popper, is based more on direct observation of historical phenomena of science and actual practice of scientific life.
The book selections Laudan note that we represent an attempt to synthesize positions contradictory and in some ways offers a test of reconciliation of thesis Popper and Kuhn. In any case, represents a more nuanced epistemology, which seeks to give weight to various factors, including the logical and historical.
One of the key problems is Laudan is the formation of scientific consensus.
For him the problem is quite complex because there are levels of knowledge in the scientific position that is necessary to distinguish: the level of the facts, the rules of the methodological and cognitive values, form a hierarchy, where the values dominate cognitive methodological rules and these facts.
Consensus can refer to any of those levels and usually disagreements are resolved at an ascending to another level where there is no disagreement. This leads us to postulate that at the highest level, that of cognitive values \u200b\u200bcan not be resolved disagreements. However, particular merit of this author, have pointed out that there is a complex process of mutual adjustment between levels and reciprocal justification "justification both flows upward and downward, linking goals, methods and assertions of fact."
The anthology continues with a very short selection Thomas Hobbes. This quote is famous porque es el más claro ejemplo que nos provee la filosofía clásica de una declaración contundente del concepto informático de la mente. Por ella se considera a Hobbes el precursor del paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas. Para Hobbes, "razonar no es más que sacar cuentas", y todos los más complicados pensamientos se reducen a operaciones fundamentales de carácter aritmético.
Continúa nuestra selección de lecturas con una aún más breve cita de G.W. Leibniz , el otro gran precursor del paradigma informático. Leibniz era un convencido del carácter fundamentalmente lógico de la estructura del universo. Dentro de ese espíritu, came to conceive of a mathematical language to formulate and solve any problem you can conceive, whether in the scientific field, whether in the area of \u200b\u200bhuman relations NOTE 3. In this language was called, in Latin, characteristica universalis, meaning universal categorization, method of representing all things and all situations.
The text of Alan Turing is historically important capital. This article, which appeared in 1950, represents the birth of one of the main subjects that we associate with cognitive science, namely artificial intelligence. For the first time it is played seriously in a scientific journal exotic problem if the machines may one day think. Of particular importance in relation to this article, the author is the same person who in the thirties had been a revolution in mathematics, formalizing the concept of algorithm and introduced the fruitful concept of the universal machine that bears his name, such machine was to turn the model that inspired it, in the forties, the creators of the digital computer.
Turing's analysis can be considered the culmination of a general movement towards a mechanistic, physicalist explanation of the thinking and behavior humans, as evidenced in the seventeenth century, as exemplified by the discovery of blood circulation by Harvey, Descartes' ideas about animals (whom he regarded as machines), the conception of reasoning as simple Hobbes and Leibniz calculation (88 Gandy ).
Regardless of that historical value, the article is important for two reasons. The first is that it is a description of a test, since then known as the Turing test to decide whether a machine possesses intelligence. It consists, in summary that, if a person believes he has as a partner (through a teletype machine) to another person, when in reality it is a machine that behaves like a person, then the machine is said to be intelligent (until today, no machine has been able to pass this test.) The second is that this paper presents an inventory of possible objections to the possibility of intelligence in a machine, and are refuted by the author, carefully, one by one.
this article is generally regarded as the forerunner of cognitive science in the contemporary sense. We can even say that Turing's thought, here represented, is the very paradigm of these sciences. For the first time we see it, if only implicitly, consideration of the human brain as a machine of some type, which could in principle be mimicked by a universal machine (or computer). What consequences follow from considering the human mind as an embodiment of a universal machine, just as are the computers? The consequences are extraordinary, neither more nor less than unify the cognitive sciences and bring productivity to a level never reached before by them-exactly what corresponds to an intellectual revolution as we associate with the advent of Newtonian paradigm or Lavoisier or Darwin.
By exploring these implications, we must take into account two ambiguities in machine design. When we say that a Turing machine can emulate any other machine we must assume that if the machine is not simply imitated an abstract machine (mathematically defined) but a particular machine, the Turing machine must be done physically and have effector organs and sensitivity that enable them to perform practical tasks. The second ambiguity that must be cleared has to do with the pejorative connotation that we normally associate with the word machine. Oppose the terms "mechanical" and "vital" as rigid to flexible, adaptable to the insensible, the grotesque and the humorous. But none of that is valid against the plasticity of the new machines related to electronics, appliances quintessential flexible and adaptable to circumstances. This idea of \u200b\u200ba new machine concept is broad and brilliantly analyzed by Marvin Minsky in his book The Society of Mind, which included a selection representative as the culmination of the chapter.
NOTE 1 Other parts of the theory of science that are not epistemology are, for example, sociology of science or the history of science.
NOTE 2 Visit Gutierrez and Brenes article in the third chapter of this collection to better understand this opposition.
NOTE 3 famously Leibniz diplomatic interventions in the Europe of his time seeking the settlement of international peace.
La epistemología es la parte más importante de la teoría de la ciencia NOTA 1 ; implica el estudio de las ideas científicas desde el punto de vista de su validez como conocimiento.
Algunos autores prefieren llamarla filosofía de la ciencia y aun otros gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento; nosotros usaremos estos nombres indiferentemente, aunque reconocemos que algunos filósofos hacen distinciones sutiles entre los significados de estos términos.
Es necesario anotar que algunos psicólogos, como Jean Piaget, usan el término epistemología en un sentido bastante diferente al que empleamos aquí: no tanto como el estudio de la validez of knowledge but as a study of its genesis in the minds of people, especially in children.
However, to some extent the two concepts interpenetrate each other, since the development of individual minds should be in much the same way the original discovery of the ideas of humanity, so that some authors have noted a parallel between the emergence of knowledge in the individual and the species.
is important to be careful to distinguish the epistemology of the next disciplines of logic and psychology. The three disciplines have to do with knowledge, but from different viewpoints.
psychology to be discussed knowing as the psycho-physical entity, for its part, the logical thinking of studying their parts and relationships, seeking to establish formal principles of knowledge. Corresponds to epistemology instead clarifying the relationship of knowledge as a subject and an object, in particular, the elucidation of the correspondence of thought with the reality to which it refers. We also distinguish
epistemology as the study of the validity of knowledge, theory (or philosophy) of mind. The latter, with a long history in Western culture that goes back to classical Greek philosophers, seeking to understand the nature of the mind, not their ability to form valid judgments. In recent history, from the Renaissance, we see two basic positions on the subject: dualism, represented especially by René Descartes, which postulates the mind as the body of a different nature, and materialism, which regards the mind as action of a biological organ, namely, the human brain. The relations of epistemology with the theory of mind are narrower, however, that you may have with other disciplines related to knowledge. On these pages we devote to the theory of mind enough space in chapter six.
specifically now to the theory of science itself, in its recent history of this century, we can say that has gone through several distinct stages. The first decades were dominated by neo-positivism, or logical positivism, which held the great work of introducing symbolic logic or mathematical discipline. We can say that transformed radically from its traditional philosophical style in a rigorous discipline and supported by a considerable formal apparatus.
In the forties, developed a form of transition that moves away from positivism, but without abandoning the emphasis on the logical structure of scientific statements, introduced by that: it is the philosophy of science Karl Popper and his followers rejected the idea of \u200b\u200ba logic of confirmation (or inductive logic) neopositivists feature. Instead of confirmation, the emphasis in the refutation of theories, which must prove its mettle surviving the attempt to prove they are false.
In the sixties you enter a new period, with the work of Thomas Kuhn , which changes the emphasis from the logical structure of scientific claims to the historical experiences of these same statements. The important thing now happens to be not confirmed or rebuttal, but fidelity to scientific paradigms or abandonment. A scientific paradigm, according to Thomas Kuhn, is a major scientific breakthrough that changes the way science practitioners of the disciplines concerned. Examples are the Copernican theory and its influence on the way to practice astronomy, or the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier and the emergence, from the resulting theory of combustion, all of modern chemistry. Another paradigm of great importance is the Newtonian mechanics, which manages to unite astronomy and terrestrial mechanics in a superscience, modern physics. Still others are the doctrine of evolution postulada por Darwin y la teoría celular, que cambian en los últimos ciento cincuenta años la manera de practicar las ciencias biológicas. Podemos mencionar también como paradigmática la obra gigantesca –en nuestro siglo– de los físicos Einstein y Planck, que juntos destronaron al tan exitoso paradigma newtoniano. Finalmente, muchos autores contemporáneos hablan de un paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas para referirse a la obra de Alan Turing , que mencionamos más adelante.
En las selecciones que incluimos en este capítulo podemos ver con más detalle algunos de los aspectos de esta sucesión de teorías epistemológicas. The article by Thomas R. Grimes is an introduction to the philosophy of science that we associate with neo-positivist or logical positivist movement. Coincides with the point of view which gives the hypothetical-deductive method of importance in the acceptance-or rejection-of a theory.
For those not familiar with the hypothetical-deductive or symbolic logic notation, we recommend deferring the study of this article after studying the article Gutierrez and Brenes the third chapter, which introduces the method hypothetical-deductive with minimal use of logical-mathematical formalisms.
Being so new, this paper represents late neo-positivist approach that is very aware of the logical difficulties that have been raised against this epistemological approach over recent decades. At the same time, Grimes tries to underline "the basic truth" that underlies this approach, namely the idea that "a hypothesis is confirmed on the basis of their observational consequences," the author insists that merit is enough to try to save it. The article proceeds to present some important attempts to modify the original epistemological thesis, through adjustments in their respective logical theory. Shows how these attempts, which complicate the theory, not totally save her difficulties. Finally, he recommends a return to the original version, which faults the author is convinced that there are enough to dismiss it.
The text of Karl R. Popper corresponds to a stand still in the mainstream formal logic but intense reacts against neo-positivist position. Basically rejects the epistemological idea that we can confirm the truth of a hypothesis or theory with its repeated verification. With strictly logical arguments based on the contrast between ponendo modus ponens and modus tollens tollendo NOTE 2 shows how any number of observations confirmed a hypothesis would not be enough to let us accept as true, while a single observation enough to let us leave refuting false. In considering this issue, proceed to ratify the impossibility of inductive logic, as shown by the philosopher David Hume.
occasion of his entire argument, the author makes an elucidation of important terms in philosophy of science, such as those of universal statements and existential statements. Ends his argument with the thesis, very important for your epistemological position, that science really can not come to know property nothing: we can only guess. This conclusion should be taken with caution, however. The author does not intend to give this foundation to make us feel at liberty to accept any kind of conjecture: the scientific method, which involves scientists redoubled effort to demonstrate that their own theories, or those of others, are false, ensures that conjecture that survive the onslaught have shown their mettle. Only those assumptions are what we accept.
This position entails the prediction that scientists leave a hypothesis or theory always a case that is contrary or longer fulfilled a prediction. If now we consider herself as a theory, and if the prediction is that scientists abandon their theories when they encounter cases to the contrary, it is, as Thomas Kuhn, that we should reject the doctrine of Popper on behalf of herself.
Indeed, Kuhn presents in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which we have translated a selection for this chapter, a lot of examples from the history of science in which scientists Where not otherwise accept as a refutation of their theories, but rather defend against them in a thousand different ways, the simplest is to consider them as mere anomalies, leaving them on hold for further study. Kuhn takes this as a basis for a theory of alternative science, instead of relying on the logical analysis of scientific claims, as the positivists and Popper, is based more on direct observation of historical phenomena of science and actual practice of scientific life.
The book selections Laudan note that we represent an attempt to synthesize positions contradictory and in some ways offers a test of reconciliation of thesis Popper and Kuhn. In any case, represents a more nuanced epistemology, which seeks to give weight to various factors, including the logical and historical.
One of the key problems is Laudan is the formation of scientific consensus.
For him the problem is quite complex because there are levels of knowledge in the scientific position that is necessary to distinguish: the level of the facts, the rules of the methodological and cognitive values, form a hierarchy, where the values dominate cognitive methodological rules and these facts.
Consensus can refer to any of those levels and usually disagreements are resolved at an ascending to another level where there is no disagreement. This leads us to postulate that at the highest level, that of cognitive values \u200b\u200bcan not be resolved disagreements. However, particular merit of this author, have pointed out that there is a complex process of mutual adjustment between levels and reciprocal justification "justification both flows upward and downward, linking goals, methods and assertions of fact."
The anthology continues with a very short selection Thomas Hobbes. This quote is famous porque es el más claro ejemplo que nos provee la filosofía clásica de una declaración contundente del concepto informático de la mente. Por ella se considera a Hobbes el precursor del paradigma computacional de las ciencias cognoscitivas. Para Hobbes, "razonar no es más que sacar cuentas", y todos los más complicados pensamientos se reducen a operaciones fundamentales de carácter aritmético.
Continúa nuestra selección de lecturas con una aún más breve cita de G.W. Leibniz , el otro gran precursor del paradigma informático. Leibniz era un convencido del carácter fundamentalmente lógico de la estructura del universo. Dentro de ese espíritu, came to conceive of a mathematical language to formulate and solve any problem you can conceive, whether in the scientific field, whether in the area of \u200b\u200bhuman relations NOTE 3. In this language was called, in Latin, characteristica universalis, meaning universal categorization, method of representing all things and all situations.
The text of Alan Turing is historically important capital. This article, which appeared in 1950, represents the birth of one of the main subjects that we associate with cognitive science, namely artificial intelligence. For the first time it is played seriously in a scientific journal exotic problem if the machines may one day think. Of particular importance in relation to this article, the author is the same person who in the thirties had been a revolution in mathematics, formalizing the concept of algorithm and introduced the fruitful concept of the universal machine that bears his name, such machine was to turn the model that inspired it, in the forties, the creators of the digital computer.
Turing's analysis can be considered the culmination of a general movement towards a mechanistic, physicalist explanation of the thinking and behavior humans, as evidenced in the seventeenth century, as exemplified by the discovery of blood circulation by Harvey, Descartes' ideas about animals (whom he regarded as machines), the conception of reasoning as simple Hobbes and Leibniz calculation (88 Gandy ).
Regardless of that historical value, the article is important for two reasons. The first is that it is a description of a test, since then known as the Turing test to decide whether a machine possesses intelligence. It consists, in summary that, if a person believes he has as a partner (through a teletype machine) to another person, when in reality it is a machine that behaves like a person, then the machine is said to be intelligent (until today, no machine has been able to pass this test.) The second is that this paper presents an inventory of possible objections to the possibility of intelligence in a machine, and are refuted by the author, carefully, one by one.
this article is generally regarded as the forerunner of cognitive science in the contemporary sense. We can even say that Turing's thought, here represented, is the very paradigm of these sciences. For the first time we see it, if only implicitly, consideration of the human brain as a machine of some type, which could in principle be mimicked by a universal machine (or computer). What consequences follow from considering the human mind as an embodiment of a universal machine, just as are the computers? The consequences are extraordinary, neither more nor less than unify the cognitive sciences and bring productivity to a level never reached before by them-exactly what corresponds to an intellectual revolution as we associate with the advent of Newtonian paradigm or Lavoisier or Darwin.
By exploring these implications, we must take into account two ambiguities in machine design. When we say that a Turing machine can emulate any other machine we must assume that if the machine is not simply imitated an abstract machine (mathematically defined) but a particular machine, the Turing machine must be done physically and have effector organs and sensitivity that enable them to perform practical tasks. The second ambiguity that must be cleared has to do with the pejorative connotation that we normally associate with the word machine. Oppose the terms "mechanical" and "vital" as rigid to flexible, adaptable to the insensible, the grotesque and the humorous. But none of that is valid against the plasticity of the new machines related to electronics, appliances quintessential flexible and adaptable to circumstances. This idea of \u200b\u200ba new machine concept is broad and brilliantly analyzed by Marvin Minsky in his book The Society of Mind, which included a selection representative as the culmination of the chapter.
NOTE 1 Other parts of the theory of science that are not epistemology are, for example, sociology of science or the history of science.
NOTE 2 Visit Gutierrez and Brenes article in the third chapter of this collection to better understand this opposition.
NOTE 3 famously Leibniz diplomatic interventions in the Europe of his time seeking the settlement of international peace.
Source: pg. Id. 542-545.
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